The Utah Supreme Court recently handed down a significant opinion in State v. Dustin Giles Andrus, addressing critical issues at the intersection of modern technology and criminal defense. The case, decided on May 29, 2025, involved convictions stemming from a relationship between the adult defendant and a sixteen-year-old girl. The Court’s analysis provides valuable insights into electronic privacy laws, the evidence required for certain sexual offenses and human trafficking charges, and the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence.
This case is particularly relevant for anyone involved in criminal defense, especially those facing charges involving sexual offenses, drug possession and distribution, or cases where digital forensics plays a key role in the investigation.
Navigating State and Federal Lines: Electronic Evidence and EIDPA
A central issue in State v. Andrus was the legality of how investigators obtained electronic records connecting the defendant to the victim. State detectives, investigating the case, asked federal officers on a joint task force (the FBI’s Child Exploitation Task Force, CETF) to use federal administrative subpoenas to get subscriber records from Snapchat and TextNow. These records included IP addresses, which led to the defendant’s phone number and address.
The defendant argued that this process violated Utah’s Electronic Information or Data Privacy Act (EIDPA) and the Utah Constitution. EIDPA sets out a framework for how state law enforcement can obtain electronic records and includes an exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of its terms.
The Court’s Majority Ruling on Electronic Evidence: The Utah Supreme Court’s majority concluded that EIDPA’s exclusionary rule does not require suppression of evidence that federal law enforcement officers lawfully obtained under federal law and then shared with state officers. The Court reasoned that EIDPA primarily regulates the conduct of Utah law enforcement agencies, not federal agencies. The majority interpreted EIDPA’s exclusionary rule, which applies to records “obtained in violation of the provisions of this chapter”, as requiring suppression only if state officers obtained the records directly from a service provider without following EIDPA’s required procedures (like getting a court order under the Subpoena Powers Statute). If state officers receive records from federal officers who obtained them lawfully, EIDPA does not mandate exclusion.
The Court found the federal administrative subpoenas were valid under federal law because they were sought as part of an investigation into potential federal offenses involving the sexual exploitation or abuse of children, such as child enticement and possession of child pornography, which are listed as qualifying offenses under the federal subpoena statute. The Court determined that the validity of the federal subpoena didn’t depend on the primary focus being federal or the specific subjective intent of the officers, but rather on whether the investigation involved potential qualifying federal offenses. Since it did, the subpoenas were valid, and EIDPA’s exclusionary rule didn’t apply when the federal officers shared the records with the state officers.
The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the Utah Constitution required suppression, stating that he had not shown the search was constitutionally unreasonable, particularly since he conceded a search is reasonable with a valid subpoena.
The Dissent’s View: Justice Pohlman authored a dissenting opinion, disagreeing with the majority’s interpretation of EIDPA. The dissent argued that EIDPA’s plain language does require exclusion because the state detective, Carlson, a state officer, obtained the subscriber records without following the procedures laid out in Utah’s Subpoena Powers Statute.
The dissent focused on Section 77-23c-104(2), which states that a state “law enforcement agency may not obtain, use, copy, or disclose a subscriber record,” except as permitted by the Subpoena Powers Statute. Obtaining records through federal officers, even if lawful federally, bypassed this specific state procedure. The dissent argued that the exclusionary rule in Section 77-23c-105, applying to records “obtained in violation of the provisions of this chapter”, was triggered by the state officer’s action of obtaining the records without following the state process. The dissent found no ambiguity in the statute requiring it to look beyond the text. This difference in interpretation highlights a crucial area of contention in cases involving multi-jurisdictional investigations and digital forensics.
Sufficiency of Evidence Challenges: Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation
The defendant also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions for human trafficking of a child and sexual exploitation of a minor.
Human Trafficking of a Child: At the time of the offense, the statute defined human trafficking of a child as recruiting, harboring, transporting, obtaining, patronizing, or soliciting a child for sexual exploitation or forced labor. “Sexual exploitation” included “commercial sexual activity with a child,” which in turn was defined as “any sexual act with a child, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person”.
The defendant argued the evidence showed only offers of value (money, car, place to live), not that anything of value was actually given or received on account of a sexual act. The State argued that merely soliciting (offering) was enough under the statute.
The Court agreed with the defendant on this point. Reading the human trafficking statute alongside related sexual solicitation statutes, the Court concluded that a conviction for human trafficking of a child requires proof that something of value was actually given to or received by the child, not just offered. The Court found the evidence that the defendant gave the girl marijuana was insufficient to prove it was given “on account of” a sexual act (i.e., in exchange for it), as there was no testimony indicating a prior promise or exchange.
Result: The Court vacated the conviction for human trafficking of a child due to insufficient evidence.
Sexual Exploitation of a Minor (Child Pornography Production): The defendant was also convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor. At the time, this included knowingly “produc[ing]” child pornography. “Produce” included “directing the creation of” visual depictions of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
The evidence showed the defendant asked the girl for “nude photos” and “sexy pics,” and after she said she deleted saved photos, he asked for “a snap of you today”.
The Court held that a reasonable jury could infer from this evidence that the defendant was directing the girl to create new nude photographs for him, which constitutes “producing” child pornography under the jury instructions (to which both parties stipulated).
Result: The Court affirmed the conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor. This part of the ruling is directly relevant to cases involving sexual offenses and online interactions.
Sufficiency of Evidence: Distribution of a Controlled Substance
The defendant challenged his conviction for distribution of a controlled substance (marijuana), arguing that the conviction couldn’t rest solely on the girl’s lay testimony identifying the substance without scientific testing.
The statute made it unlawful to knowingly distribute or offer to distribute a controlled substance like marijuana.
The evidence included the girl’s testimony that the defendant gave her marijuana, which she smoked, on multiple occasions. She also testified to having used marijuana before and being familiar with its effects.
The Court held that, under the standard of review for a jury verdict, the girl’s testimony that she had used marijuana before and received it from the defendant was sufficient competent evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer she recognized the substance as marijuana. While acknowledging the State ideally would have provided more detailed testimony or scientific evidence, the Court concluded that the jury could reasonably use their common sense to make this inference based on her stated prior experience.
Result: The Court affirmed the conviction for distribution of a controlled substance. This is a key point regarding evidence standards in drug possession and distribution cases.
Admissibility of Evidence of Uncharged Conduct (Rule 404(b))
Finally, the defendant challenged the admission of evidence related to activities in a different county (Summit County) that were not formally charged in the Davis County trial. This included testimony about sexual activity there, being given alcohol and marijuana, and physical evidence found in his home a year later (underwear, flask, marijuana, THC cartridges).
The Court reviewed the evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which generally bars evidence of other crimes or acts to prove character, but allows it for purposes like identity, motive, etc.
The Court’s Ruling on Uncharged Conduct Evidence:
1. Sexual Activity and Underwear: The Court found the testimony about the sexual activity in Summit County and the discovery of the girl’s underwear in the defendant’s home was properly admitted. The underwear served as the only physical evidence linking the defendant to his online alias, directly relevant to the issue of identity. The testimony explained how the underwear got there.
2. Alcohol, Marijuana, and Search Results: The Court assumed, without deciding, that admitting the evidence about being given alcohol/marijuana in Summit County and finding related items during the search a year later was an error. However, the Court concluded that any such error was harmless. The jury was instructed to use this evidence only to support the charged offenses in Davis County, not as proof of separate crimes. Other evidence, particularly the explicit text messages and the underwear, strongly corroborated the girl’s testimony and identified the defendant. Given this strong evidence, the Summit County drug and alcohol evidence was deemed unlikely to have affected the jury’s verdict or undermined confidence in the outcome.
Result: The Court upheld the admission of the evidence related to identity and found any error in admitting the drug/alcohol evidence from the other county to be harmless.
Conclusion
The State v. Andrus opinion touches upon several critical aspects of criminal defense in Utah. It clarifies the application of EIDPA in investigations involving collaboration between state and federal agencies, offering a specific interpretation of when Utah’s exclusionary rule applies to electronic records obtained through federal means – a crucial point for digital forensics. It also refines the elements required for human trafficking of a child, distinguishing mere offers from actual exchanges of value. Finally, it provides guidance on the sufficiency of lay witness testimony for identifying controlled substances in drug possession and distribution cases and reaffirms principles for admitting evidence of uncharged conduct under Rule 404(b).
This case demonstrates the complex legal landscape faced by defendants in cases involving technology, online interactions, and multi-jurisdictional investigations. Understanding these nuances is vital for effective criminal defense.